Dear Shareholder,
The remuneration committee's well-defined policy of relating pay to the performance of the company continues to be central in determining
the remuneration of the executive directors. As is commented on in BP Annual Report and Accounts 2003, the company produced strong financial
results in 2003 as well as excellent progress on the implementation of the company's strategic plans.
The outcome of the committee's assessment for 2003 has therefore been
an increase in the performance-related annual bonus and share element of the Executive Directors' Incentive Plan, compared with the reductions
in 2002. Share option grants, made in February 2003, were maintained at the same level as 2002. Salaries, other than for promotions, were
increased by up to 5% mid-year to maintain our competitive position. Further details on the above are set out in the committee's report.
The independent process and advice the committee utilizes continue to give
us confidence in our policy and its application. We also value our dialogue with major shareholders. During 2004, we will be conducting a comprehensive
review of our plans and policies with an expectation of bringing new long-term plans to shareholders for approval in 2005 when our current Executive
Directors' Incentive Plan expires.
I am confident that our approach will continue to align executive directors'
remuneration with the interests of shareholders as well as retain and engage the world-class team of individuals we have leading the company.

Sir Robin Nicholson
Chairman, Remuneration Committee
9 February 2004
The remuneration committee
Tasks
The committee's tasks are set out in the board governance policies adopted by the board and include:
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Determining the terms of engagement and remuneration
of the group chief executive and the executive directors and
reporting on those to the shareholders. |
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Determining on behalf of the board matters
of policy over which the company has authority relating to the
establishment or operation of the company's pension scheme of
which the executive directors are members. |
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Nominating on behalf of the board any trustees
of such scheme. |
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Monitoring the policies being applied by the group chief
executive in remunerating senior executives other than executive
directors. |
Constitution and operation
The committee members are all non-executive directors. The membership throughout 2003 was: Sir Robin Nicholson (chairman), Mr Davis, Dr Julius, Mr Knight and Sir Ian Prosser.
Currently, each member of the committee is subject to re-election every three years; however, annual re-election is proposed from 2005. The board considers all the members
of the committee to be independent (see Related links). The committee met six times in 2003. There was a full attendance record, except that Sir Ian and Mr Davis were each
unable to attend one meeting.
Advice
The committee receives independent advice from the company secretary's office, which is independent of executive management and reports to the non-executive chairman.
Mr Aronson, an independent consultant within the company secretary's office, was appointed by the committee as its secretary and special adviser. The committee also
appoints external independent professional advisers to provide additional specialist advice on particular matters.
Policy on executive directors' remuneration
Main principles
The remuneration committee's reward policy reflects its aim to align executive directors' remuneration with shareholders' interests and
to engage world-class executive talent for the benefit of the group. The main principles of the policy are:
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Total rewards should be set at appropriate levels to reflect the competitive global market in which BP operates. |
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The majority of the total reward should be linked to the achievement of demanding performance targets. |
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Executive directors' incentives should be aligned with the interests of ordinary shareholders. This is achieved through setting performance targets
that take account of measures of shareholders' interests and through the committee's policy that each executive director should hold a significant shareholding
in the company, equivalent in value to 5 x the directors' base salary. |
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The performance targets in the Executive Directors' Incentive Plan should encompass demanding comparisons of BP's shareholder returns and earnings with
those of other companies in its own industry and in the broader marketplace. |
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The wider scene, including pay and employment conditions elsewhere in the group, should be taken into account, especially when determining annual salary increases. |
The company's existing policy on executive directors' remuneration will remain in place for 2004. The committee is conducting a comprehensive review of its policies in the
course of 2004 prior to the expiry of the current Executive Directors' Incentive Plan in April 2005. New policies will be described in the next remuneration report for
shareholder approval and specific shareholder authorization will be sought for any new long-term share incentive plans.
Elements of remuneration
The executive directors' total remuneration consists of salary, annual bonus, long-term incentives, pensions and other benefits. This reward structure is regularly
reviewed by the committee to ensure that it is achieving its objectives. In 2004, over three-quarters of executive directors' potential direct remuneration will
again be performance-related (see illustrative chart below).

This chart reflects on-target values for annual bonus and share element, and a Black Scholes value for the share option element.
Salary
Each executive director receives a fixed sum payable monthly in cash.
The committee expects to review salaries in 2004 in line with global markets. In doing so the committee considers appropriate comparator groups in both Europe and
the US which are defined and analysed by external remuneration advisers engaged independently by the committee.
Annual bonus
Each executive director is eligible to participate in an annual performance-based bonus scheme. The remuneration committee reviews and sets bonus targets and
levels of eligibility annually.
The target level is 100% of base salary (except for Lord Browne, for whom, as group chief
executive, it is considered appropriate to have a target of 110%). There is a stretch level of 150% of base salary for substantially exceeding targets. Outstanding
performance may be recognized by bonus payments in excess of stretch level at the discretion of the remuneration committee. Executive directors' annual bonus awards for
2004 will be based on a mix of demanding financial targets relating to the company's annual plan and leadership objectives established at the beginning of the year.
In addition to stretching milestones and long-run metrics to track the enactment of strategy, they include areas such as people, safety, environment and organization.
Long-term incentives
Long-term incentives are provided under the Executive Directors' Incentive Plan (EDIP). It has three elements: a share element, a share option element and a cash element.
Each executive director participates in this plan. The committee's policy, subject to unforeseen circumstances, is that this should continue until the plan expires or is
renewed in April 2005. The committee's policy that each executive director should hold shares equivalent in value to 5 x the directors' base salary is reflected in the
terms of the plan.
1. Share element
The share element permits the remuneration committee to grant 'performance units' to executive directors. These are notional units that give the directors the right to
be considered for an award of shares (without payment by the directors) at the end of a three-year performance period if demanding performance conditions are met.
The committee determines the number of units to be awarded each year. The maximum value that may be granted in any one year will not normally exceed twice the base
salary. A maximum of two shares may be awarded for each unit. Shares awarded are then held in trust for three years before they are released to the individual.
This gives the executive directors a six-year incentive structure. Shares will only be released at the end of the retention period if the company's minimum shareholding
guidelines have been met.

The share element compares BP's performance against the oil and gas sector over three years on a rolling basis. This is assessed in terms of a three-year total
shareholder return against the market (SHRAM), return on average capital employed (ROACE) and earnings per share growth, based on pro forma results adjusted
for special items (EPS). The committee reviews and approves annually the performance measures and the comparator companies.
2. Share option element
The share option element of the EDIP is designed to reflect BP's performance relative to a wider selection of global companies. It has a three-year pre-grant performance
requirement. Options may be granted to executive directors at an exercise price no lower than the market value of a share at the date the option is granted. Options
vest over three years after grant (one-third each after one, two and three years respectively). They have a life of seven years after grant.
It is the committee's policy to continue to exercise its judgement in 2004 to decide the number of
options to be granted to each executive director, taking into account BP's total shareholder return (TSR) compared with the TSR for the FTSE Global 100 group of companies
over the three years preceding the grant. The committee will not grant options in any year unless the criteria for an award of shares under the share element have been met.
3. Cash element
The cash element allows the remuneration committee to grant cash rather than share-based incentives in exceptional circumstances. This element was not used in 2003 and
the committee has no present intention to use it in 2004.
Pensions
Executive directors are eligible to participate in the appropriate pension schemes applying in their home countries.
UK directors
UK directors are members of the BP Pension Scheme. The scheme offers Inland Revenue-approved retirement benefits based on final salary.
In accordance with the company's long-standing practice for executive
directors who retire from BP on or after age 55 having accrued at least 30 years' service, Mr Chase received from the company in 2003 an
ex-gratia lump-sum superannuation payment equal to one year's base salary following his retirement. Lord Browne remains eligible for
consideration for such a payment. No other executive director is eligible for consideration for a superannuation payment on retirement,
as the committee decided in 1996 that appointees to the board after that time should cease to be eligible for consideration for such a payment.
US director
Dr Grote as a US director participates in the US BP Retirement Accumulation Plan (US Plan), which features a cash balance formula, and
in the Supplemental Executive Retirement Benefit, which is a non-qualified top-up arrangement.
Service contracts
The committee's policy on executive directors' service contracts is for them to contain a maximum notice period of one year. This policy has
now been fully implemented. Since January 2003, the committee has included a provision in new service contracts to allow for severance payments
to be phased where appropriate to do so. It will also consider mitigation to reduce compensation to a departing director where appropriate
to do so. A large proportion of each executive directors' total remuneration is linked to performance and therefore will not be payable to
the extent that the relevant targets are not met.
Information subject to audit
Summary of 2003 Remuneration
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| Annual
remuneration |
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Long-term
remuneration |
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Share
element of EDIP/LTPP |
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Grants
under EDIP |
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2001-2003
plan |
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2000-2002
plan |
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(to
be awarded
in Feb 2004) |
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(awarded
in Feb 2003) |
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(granted
in Feb 2003) |
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Salary (thousand) |
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Annual perfromance bonus (thousand) |
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Non-cash benefits & other emoluments (thousand) |
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Total (thousand) |
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Expected awarda (shares) |
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Valueb (thousand) |
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Actual award (shares) |
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Valuec (thousand) |
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2003-2005 share elementd (performance units) |
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Share option elemente (options) |
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2002 |
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2003 |
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2002 |
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2003 |
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2002 |
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2003 |
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2002 |
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2003 |
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| Lord Browne |
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£1,284 |
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£1,316 |
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£1,695 |
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£1,882 |
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£52 |
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£79 |
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£3,031 |
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£3,277 |
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352,750 |
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£1,503 |
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224,000 |
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£887 |
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632,512 |
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1,348,032 |
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| Dr D C
Allenf |
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n/a |
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£367 |
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n/a |
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£459 |
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n/a |
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£2 |
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n/a |
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£828 |
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62,518 |
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£266 |
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n/a |
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n/a |
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197,044 |
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220,000 |
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| Dr B E
Grote |
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$713 |
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$770 |
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$856 |
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$1,001 |
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$302 |
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$179 |
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$1,871 |
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$1,950 |
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131,750 |
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$1,063 |
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68,000 |
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$449 |
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233,638 |
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349,038 |
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| Dr A B
Haywardf |
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n/a |
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£367 |
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n/a |
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£459 |
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n/a |
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£3 |
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n/a |
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£829 |
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54,825 |
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£234 |
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n/a |
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n/a |
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197,044 |
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220,000 |
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| J A Manzonif |
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n/a |
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£367 |
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n/a |
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£477 |
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n/a |
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£34 |
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n/a |
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£878 |
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51,170 |
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£218 |
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n/a |
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n/a |
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197,044 |
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220,000 |
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| R L Olver |
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£530 |
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£570 |
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£636 |
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£741 |
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£37 |
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£43 |
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£1,203 |
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£1,354 |
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144,500 |
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£616 |
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117,600 |
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£466 |
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274,138 |
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370,956 |
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Director
leaving the board in 2003 |
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| R F Chaseh |
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£640 |
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£231 |
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£768 |
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£295 |
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£32 |
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£30 |
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£1,440 |
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£556 |
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174,250 |
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£742 |
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139,200 |
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£551 |
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Amounts
shown are in the currency received by executive directors. Annual
bonus is shown in the year it was earned. |
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| a |
Gross award of shares based
on a performance assessment by the remuneration committee and
on the other terms of the plan. Sufficient shares are sold to
pay for tax applicable. Remaining shares are held in trust until
2007 when they are released to the individual. |
| b |
Based on closing price of BP
shares on 9 February 2004 (£4.26 per share/$48.40 per ADS). |
| c |
Based on average market price
on date of award (£3.96 per share/$39.62 per ADS). |
| d |
Performance units granted under
the 2003-2005 share element of the EDIP are converted to shares
at the end of the performance period. Maximum of two shares
per performance unit. |
| e |
Options granted in February
2003 have a grant price of £3.88 per share. Dr Grote holds options
over ADSs; the above numbers reflect calculated equivalents. |
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Reflects remuneration received
since appointment as executive director on 1 February 2003. |
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Includes resettlement allowances
for Dr Grote of $300,000 and $175,000 in 2002 and 2003 respectively. |
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Amounts for Mr Chase reflect
the period until his retirement in May 2003. |
Salary
Base salaries for Lord Browne, Mr Olver and Dr Grote were increased by 5% per annum with effect from 1 July 2003 following a review of
appropriate comparator groups. Apart from the 5% promotional increases for Mr Olver and Dr Grote on their appointments to deputy group
chief executive and chief financial officer respectively, the three directors had received no salary increases since January 2002. Dr Allen,
Dr Hayward and Mr Manzoni have received no salary increases since their appointments to the board in February 2003.
Annual bonus
The annual bonus awards for 2003 are based on a mix of financial targets and leadership objectives established at the beginning of the
year. Assessment of all the results produced an award of around 85% of stretch level (stretch level is 150% of base salary). All calculations
in relation to the annual bonus have been reviewed by the auditors.
Share options
Share option grants in 2003 as shown in the table above were maintained at the same level as in 2002.
Share element of EDIP and Long Term Performance Plans (LTPPs)
For the 2001-2003 share element of the EDIP and the LTPP, BP's performance was assessed in terms of SHRAM, ROACE and EPS growth each
relative to that of ExxonMobil, Shell, TotalFinaElf, ChevronTexaco, ENI and Repsol. BP's SHRAM came in at sixth place among the comparator
group, fourth place on EPS growth and first place on ROACE. Based on a performance assessment of 85 points out of 200, the remuneration
committee expects to make awards of shares to executive directors in 2004 as highlighted in the table above.
Further details of share options and all long-term awards are set
out in BP Annual Report and Accounts 2003.
Past directors
Following Dr Buchanan's retirement from the BP p.l.c. board on 21 November 2002, he remained as an employee until his normal retirement
date of 8 June 2003. During that period he received a pro rata normal salary of £227,000 and a pro rata bonus of £289,425.
Following Mr Chase's retirement in May 2003, he was engaged as a
consultant to BP in relation to the TNK-BP transaction. Under this consultancy agreement, he receives $50,000 gross per month plus expenses.
This consultancy will end in May 2004.
On 21 July 2003, Mr Chase was appointed as a BP-nominated director
of TNK-BP Limited, a joint-venture company owned 50% by BP. During 2003, he received emoluments of $120,000 from TNK-BP Limited.
Long-term awards for both former directors are in accordance with
scheme rules.
Historical TSR performance
This graph shows the growth in the value of a hypothetical £100 holding in BP p.l.c. ordinary shares over five years relative to the
FTSE All World Oil & Gas Index, which is considered to be the most relevant broad equity market index for this purpose as it relates
directly to BP's sector. The graph is included to meet a legislative requirement and is not directly relevant to the performance criteria
approved by shareholders for the company's long-term incentive plans.

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